Ibn Rushd Essay — Beda Eastman

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October 2025

Is religion compatible with philosophy? How does Ibn Rushd justify faith on the grounds of reason?

The compatibility of religion and philosophy is a topic which has long been debated among the great scholars of Islam. Can philosophy, which emphasises reason and logic, possibly coexist with a belief system that relies on faith? Or will the technical nature of philosophy lead to the dismissal of revelation and traditions of religious thought? Both fields critique the other on the limitations in their perspectives. Ibn Rushd, however, stands out in history for his advocacy for the harmony between reason and faith. Ibn Rushd (1126 - 1198 CE) was a philosopher, physician, and polymath, who served as a judge for the Caliph in Al-Andalus, until the Caliph faced public pressure to burn Ibn Rushd’s works and exile him (Fakhry, 1970). An official ban was also placed, “forbidding” the study of philosophy (Leaman, 1988, p. 4). He later returned to favour, but his arguments have remained controversial within Islamic scholarship for his praise of philosophy and his interpretation of scripture through a rational perspective. He also left a global impact as his works reached the Western world under the name of ‘Averroes’ and became influential for the revival of Aristotelian philosophy (Borrowman, 2008). Ibn Rushd redefined knowledge, categorising it in such a way as to show that reason and revelation are both sources through which one can discover truth. He also argued that philosophers are able to understand scripture at a higher level than others, by using demonstrative reasoning to find inner truth. He believed that Aristotle’s ideas were aligned with Islam, showing that the compatibility of religion and faith goes beyond Islamic dialogues and indeed extends to the most highly esteemed of philosophical traditions. By exploring these ideas, it becomes clear that philosophy can be a tool that supports and strengthens religion rather than acting against it. That is not to say that Ibn Rushd’s argument is foolproof; there is ultimately an aspect of religion that is based on experience, emotion, and intuition – something that cannot be explained by reason alone – and critiques of philosophy by Islamic thinkers like Al-Ghazali (1058 - 1111 CE) emphasise this absence.

In his work ‘The Decisive Treatise’ (also translated as ‘On the Harmony of Religions and Philosophy’), Ibn Rushd presents his justification for faith on the grounds of reason, arguing that both philosophy and religion are paths to the same truth, and truth cannot contradict truth. He states:
“If the religious law is true and it ordered humans to think about finding the truth, then it is certain that philosophical thinking cannot possibly conflict with the teachings of the law. One cannot contradict another truth but rather testifies to one another” (Soleh and Rahmawati, 2023, p. 180).
The agreement of these truths is proven as Ibn Rushd categorises three types of knowledge, which Soleh and Rahmawati (2023, pp. 176-78) define as the “Unification of Source”: three sources through which one obtains knowledge, that all come from God and thus testify to His existence; different methods expressing a unified Truth. The first is empirical reality: like sense perception, through interacting with our physical surroundings, we discover the truths of the natural sciences. According to Ibn Rushd, the natural world is God’s creation, and so this source of knowledge originates from Him. The second type is reason: the ability to use rational thought and deductive reasoning is “a gift from God as a source of philosophy” (Soleh & Rahmawati, 2023, p. 177). Through this, we develop the philosophical sciences. Revelation is the third source of knowledge, which is the basis for the religious sciences (e.g. shari’ah). The prime example of revelation is the Qur’an, the word of God for Muslims, including Ibn Rushd. In ‘The Exposition of the Methods of Proof’ Ibn Rushd states that there are some truths we can only find through the revelation, namely ideas of salvation and the hereafter, and morality – matters of “good and bad” (Soleh & Rahmawati, 2023, p. 177). The strength of this concept of the three types of knowledge lies in the way it builds a connection between reason (philosophy) and revelation (religion), positioning them as equally valid and cohesive methods of understanding – as “two primary and infallible sources of truth” (Fakhry, 1970, p. 287).
Another way that Ibn Rushd connects the two is by highlighting the Qur’an’s own emphasis on using reason. He concludes in the ‘Decisive Treatise’ that pursuing philosophy is not merely compatible with scripture but is a commandment upon us by the Law (Butterworth, 2004, p. 7). As in his earlier quotation, Ibn Rushd said that Islam “orders humans to think about finding the truth”; the Qur’an repeatedly uses terms like “O people of reason” (5:100) and “do they not then reflect?” (47:24), instructing believers to ponder on the revelation in order to find success. The latter verse even goes so far as to say that there are “locks upon [the] hearts” of those who do not reflect on the Qur’an. If philosophy is defined as the study of knowledge, then the Qur’an can clearly be interpreted as prescribing philosophy. The Prophet Muhammad also spoke very highly of seekers of knowledge, stating that they are on the “roads of Paradise” and that “the learned are the heirs of the prophets” (Sunan Abi Dawud 3641). Hence, if revelation is true and teaches us to reason, using reason could not lead to knowledge that contradicts religion, as long as it is used correctly.

Ibn Rushd attempted to define what it means to use reason correctly, by developing a theory of different levels of understanding between the masses, theologians, and philosophers. It was necessary for him to develop such a theory in order to defend the idea that reason and scripture are two truths in harmony, when they sometimes seem to contradict. In ‘The Decisive Treatise’ he distinguishes three “principal types of argument,” rhetorical, dialectical, and demonstrative, and then assigns them to each group (Fakhry, 1970, p. 288). The common people or the “masses at large” rely on symbolic, rhetorical language and imagery such as parables to understand scripture. For example, God is described as ‘hearing’ and ‘seeing’ in scripture, “to remind us that God is not deprived of any kind of knowledge” (Ibn Rushd, 1954, p. 359); as the masses can only understand God’s nature through “human imagery,” though He is beyond physical limitations (Leaman, 1988, p. 77). The interpretive methods of the theologians is dialectical – the exchange of propositions based on accepted opinions (Leaman, 1988). The highest level of understanding is that of the philosophers who utilise demonstrative reasoning; logical deduction using premises to arrive at a sound conclusion (Faizi, 2016). This is the type of reasoning that arrives at the most clear and truthful judgements as it uses “necessary and certain” propositions rather than symbolism. As Ibn Rushd says, “only the masses rely on imagination, and he who is well trained in intellectual thought … renounces imagination” (Ibn Rushd, 1954, p. 213). Demonstrative reflection, says Ibn Rushd, “does not lead to differing with what is set down in the Law” (Butterworth, 2004, p. 3). Yet the Qur’an uses all three of these methods, for part of God’s wisdom is that He “addressed each class according to their understanding” – allowing all people to comprehend Truth at their level of capability (Fakhry, 1970, p. 289). Importantly, Ibn Rushd states that the masses should accept scripture “at their face value” and not try to interpret outside their level; nor should the philosophers share their demonstrative reasoning to the theologians or masses. This could lead to confusion, disbelief, and condemnation from the masses who are “not equipped to probe the hidden truths of revelation” (Fakhry, 1970, p. 290). Thus, supposed contradictions between reason and revelation are caused by people who have attempted to interpret the scripture beyond their capacity. This concept raises some critique: why, as Taylor (2006, p. 184) quotes Ibn Rushd as saying, are some people limited to a “nature” which “does not contain any greater capacity”? Can a person develop the intellectual abilities of a philosopher, or is Ibn Rushd assuming unchangeable, ontological categories in which he ranks highest?
Furthermore, Ibn Rushd claimed that scripture can be interpreted allegorically when it does not align with reason – this was another way he could maintain the parity between the two. The common person may take symbolic statements about God literally; although this does not diminish the “legitimacy of her assent … only the philosopher knows [it] is symbolic” (Faizi 2016). To support this argument Ibn Rushd uses a verse from the Qur’an itself which says that some verses are ambiguous while others are precise (Qur’an 3:7) (Fakhry, 1970). Thus a philosopher, who knows how to use demonstrative reasoning to arrive at the ultimate truths of the revelation, can discern between the literal and the allegorical, and will not find any contradiction. It is only those who function at a lower level of reasoning who may perceive incongruity between reason and faith and so unjustly condemn philosophy.

In the western philosophical tradition Ibn Rushd is best known for his commentaries on Aristotle, which played an influential role in the reintroduction of Aristotelian philosophy in the west. His “vast, multifaceted corpus of work” on Aristotle gave Ibn Rushd the title of ‘The Commentator’ and placed him as one of the most “significant Aristotelians since Aristotle himself” (Borrowman, 2008, pp. 341-42). Ibn Rushd argued for an Islamic interpretation of Aristotle’s ideas, and also brought an Aristotelian framework to his understanding of Islam, particularly in his advocacy for demonstrative reasoning. When writing his defense of philosophy in ‘The Incoherence of the Incoherence’, he uses Aristotle as an exemplar of philosophers, referencing his ideas regularly. Ibn Rushd’s acclamation of Aristotle is key to understanding his argument for the harmony of faith and reason, for it links Islamic beliefs to the most renowned traditional Greek philosophy, bridging a gap assumed by both east and west, by Islamic scholars and by western philosophers, teaching that there is much in common between the two.
Ibn Rushd argued for the agreeance of Aristotle and Islam in regards to metaphysics, causation, the importance of the intellect, a perfect ‘Mover’ who initiates all things (i.e. God) (Fakhry, 1970) (Taylor, 2005) – and many more concepts than can be encompassed in one essay – but less discussed is the alignment of Aristotelian ethics with Islam. Ibn Rushd wrote one piece, a ‘Middle Commentary’, on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, but no English translation currently exists (Hayes, 2015). Nonetheless, the similarities between Islamic ethics and Aristotle’s virtue ethics create a convincing argument for the potential for philosophy to be an instrument in support of religion rather than against it. In Islam, moderation in character and actions is emphasised, extremes are discouraged, and the religion itself is described as a middle way or ‘Straight Path’ (Qur’an 1:6). Likewise, Aristotle says that to act virtuously one must find the “mean” between “deficiency and excess”; for example, courage is the middle way between cowardice and recklessness (Aristotle, 2011, p. 28). Clear parallels exist between these two ideas. Aristotle also teaches that one must consistently build habits – or be “habituated” – in order to become a virtuous person who acts within that golden mean (Aristotle, 2011, p. 29). He gives the analogy of an archer aiming at a target to represent the necessity for a clear goal to strike the mean; an analogy which Ibn Rushd acknowledges in his ‘Middle Commentary’ (Harvey & Woerther, 2014). Essentially, development of character is at the forefront of Aristotle’s virtue ethics; just as in Islam, good character and manners are a necessary and central part of what it means to be a Muslim – the Prophet Muhammad stated that “the best of you are those who are best in character” (Sahih Bukhari 6029).
In Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle also discusses the concept of eudaimonia, the highest good, the ultimate happiness of a fulfilling life. Ibn Rushd accepted this concept, and adapted it to correlate with Islam (Harvey & Woerther, 2014). According to Aristotle “the life of moral virtue is also a happy one,” and Ibn Rushd expands this to say that both religion and philosophy “seek to obtain happiness and the truth” (Leaman, 1980, p. 170). This good and virtuous life is “available to all regardless of their capacity for rational contemplation” by “following the rules of Islam” (Leaman, 1980, p. 170). These connections evidence that the harmony between religion and philosophy extends beyond epistemology to reach ethics and practical approaches for living the good life.

Ibn Rushd’s ideas have been met with valid criticisms in the world of Islamic scholarship which pose a threat to the argument that religion is entirely compatible with philosophy. His ‘Incoherence of the Incoherence’ was a response to Al-Ghazali’s famous ‘Incoherence of the Philosophers’ which condemned philosophy as outside the fold of Islam. Ibn Rushd aimed to defend the philosophical tradition and provide explanations to what he viewed as many misunderstandings of philosophy on the part of Al-Ghazali. This dialogue had a large impact on the “development of Islamic theology”; however, the scholarly narrative widely accepts Al-Ghazali as victorious (Kadir, 2024). Thus it is important to analyse which of Al-Ghazali’s ideas have endured as critiques of Ibn Rushd. Primarily, Al-Ghazali believed that mystical experience is essential for enlightenment and the attainment of true understanding of the revelation (Bakar, 2012). His Sufi interpretation of Islam emphasised “the power and influence of God over all things,” and subsequently the renunciation of concepts like “causality” (Leaman, 1988, p. 4) – a renunciation that Ibn Rushd with his rational approach could not accept. For Sufis like Al-Ghazali, reason does not hold as much weight as intuition and spiritual experiences of God. Ibn Rushd dismissed Sufism because he maintained that it does not uphold theoretical methods, nor is there proof behind their means of interpreting the scripture (Alavijeh et al., 2024). Leaman (1988, p. 8) describes Ibn Rushd as being “concerned with the commonsensical nature of the world,” living a “spiritually unremarkable existence” – contrary to the mystics like Al-Ghazali. But Ibn Rushd’s championing of rational thought cannot counteract the reality of religion which is that for many people, faith is built on emotion and spiritual experience. This raises the question that if justification of the harmony between religion and philosophy requires the rejection of spirituality – a core aspect of the realisation of religion in human life – can there truly be perfect harmony? Religion is not composed solely of shari’ah law; Sufi practice has existed within Islam throughout its history, but Ibn Rushd does not have a rational process to incorporate it into his philosophy.

Religion and philosophy are compatible insofar as reason can be used as a supporter and justifier of faith and revelation. Ibn Rushd developed compelling arguments which unified empirical knowledge, reason, and revelation as equal and reciprocal sources for Truth, showing how scripture encourages reflection and rational thought. Furthermore, he defended the use of reason to interpret scripture, advocating allegorical exegesis and demonstrative reasoning – with the latter notably being exclusive to philosophers. His ranking of types of people in regards to their ability to discover different levels of truth within the Qur’an is lacking in scientific and ethical basis due to his belief that philosophers such as himself have “superior innate dispositions” (Ibn Rushd, 2001, p. 134); yet logically it explains the relation between reason and revelation in terms of interpretation, highlighting the shortcomings of rhetorical and dialectic reasoning. Ibn Rushd’s advocacy of Aristotelian philosophy also strengthens the harmony of the two as he emphasises resemblances between Aristotle’s ideas and Islam, not only in his understanding of the intellect but in ethics and metaphysics as well. However, his establishment of reason and religion as equals falls short because he excludes the spiritual aspect of faith. Complete compatibility can only happen when philosophy develops to incorporate intuition and mysticism as plausible sources for knowledge. Ibn Rushd’s categorisation of types of knowledge and reasoning could be expanded to include the spiritual modes of thought constructed by the Sufi scholars of Islam; otherwise, his formulation of religion misses some of its defining features. Ultimately, there are elements of faith which are not related to reason, so although the scripture encourages the seeking of knowledge, the discipline of philosophy – bound by rationality – cannot yet accept religion in its entirety.

Reference List

Alavijeh, M. Z., Nazari, F., & Fazeli, S. A. (2024). Evaluation of Ibn Rushd’s Criticisms on the Sufi Method in Theology. History of Islamic Philosophy, 3(4), 75–105.

Aristotle. (2011). Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics (R. C. Bartlett & S. D. Collins, Trans.). University Of Chicago Press.

Bakar, O. (2012). Commentary: The Importance of al-Ghazālī and Ibn Rushd in the History of Islamic Discourse on Religion and Science. In Science and Religion: Christian and Muslim Perspectives (pp. 102–110). Georgetown University Press.

Borrowman, S. (2008). The Islamization of Rhetoric: Ibn Rushd and the Reintroduction of Aristotle into Medieval Europe. Rhetoric Review, 27(4), 341–360. https://doi.org/10.1080/07350190802339242

Butterworth, C. E. (2004). Averroes and the Opinions Common to All Philosophical Investigations or What No One Can Ignore. In Averroes and the Aristotelian Heritage (pp. 11–21). Guida Editori.

Faizi, N. (2016). Averroes on the Relationship between Philosophy and Scripture: A Conditional Hierarchy. Journal of Scriptural Reasoning, 15(1). https://doi.org/10.61335/1551-3432.1065

Fakhry, M. (1970). A History of Islamic Philosophy. Columbia University Press.

Harvey, S., & Woerther, F. (2014). Averroes’ Middle Commentary on Book I of the Nicomachean Ethics. Oriens, 42(1-2), 254–287. https://doi.org/10.1163/18778372-04201009

Hayes, J. (2015). The Arabic reception of the Nicomachean Ethics. In Aristotle and the Arabic Tradition (pp. 200–213). Cambridge University Press.

Ibn Rushd. (1954). Incoherence of the Incoherence (S. Van Den Bergh, Trans.). Luzac & Co.

Ibn Rushd. (2001). The Decisive Treatise (C. E. Butterworth, Trans.). Brigham Young University.

Kadir, S. (2024). Comparative Study Of Al-Ghazali Thought and Ibn Rushd in the Perspective of Islamic Theology. International Journal of Health, Economics, and Social Sciences, 6(3), 895–903.

Leaman, O. (1980). Ibn Rushd on Happiness and Philosophy. Studia Islamica, 52, 167. https://doi.org/10.2307/1595366

Leaman, O. (1988). Averroes and His Philosophy. Clarendon Press.

Soleh, A. K., & Rahmawati, E. S. (2023). The Strength of Ibn Rushd’s Integration of Religion and Philosophy: An Islamic Historical Discourse. Journal of Al-Tamaddun, 18(2), 173–187.

Taylor, R. C. (2006). Averroes: Religious Dialectic and Aristotelian Philosophical Thought. In The Cambridge Companion to Arabic Philosophy (pp. 180–200). Cambridge University Press.

“As long as my soul stays in my body,
I am a slave of the Qur’an and the dust on the path of Muhammad, the Chosen One.
If someone interprets my words in any other way,
That person I deplore, and I deplore his words.”

- Jalal ud-Din Rumi